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Abstract
The worsening violence between Farmers and Nomadic herdsmen in Nigeria has
remained an issue of concern on the laundry list of the Nigerian State, policy makers,
security agencies, International bodies as well as Social science scholars. While
conflict is considered a normal and inevitable outcome of human relationships, the
concern here is the devastating socio-economic, political and environmental
implications of the conflict between these two livelihood groups as well as its impact
on national development. Whereas a number of factors have been adduced for this
growing violence ranging from climatic transformations, deteriorating environmental
conditions, desertification, soil degradation; political and ethnic strife; breakdown in
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms; proliferation of arms in the country and a
dysfunctional legal regime that neglects justice; this paper, relying on the demographic
theory of conflict, demonstrates how population overshoot in Nigeria explicate the new
violent and widespread dimensions of the Farmers-Herders conflict. This paper,
relying on the Demographic theory of conflict, argues that among the various causes of
the Farmers-Herders conflict, the exponential growth of Nigeria’s population and the
inability of the Nigerian State to meet the needs of the populace, contributes to the
endless contest for space and property in the country, referred to in this paper as
‘population induced warfare’. In line with this thesis, this paper recommends that
Nigeria as a country should begin to pay serious attention to the costs and impacts of
population growth and create accordingly, rights-based population policies that
adapts Nigeria’s population strength to a positive force for sustainable development.
Keywords: Conflict, demography, herders–farmers crisis, population, sustainable
development
Introduction
The history of Nigeria is replete with conflict of various dimensions, ranging
from religious to sectional violence, and to the currently escalating clashes
between livelihood groups, particularly between sedentary farmers and
itinerant herdsmen across the country. As noted by Dalhatu (2012), Muzan
(2014) and Peace Direct (2017) amid the very many complex socio-political
problems facing Nigeria, conflict and issues of national disunity remain
prevalent. In 1967 the Nigerian state was confronted with a civil war with
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Biafran separatists resulting in the death of millions of people and massive
destruction of property. Grievances in the Igbo community were again
reignited in 2015 in protests by Igbo youths and the Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB) group who still feel that the Nigerian state is yet to resolve the
issues that culminated into the civil war. Between 2006 and 2009, following
series of agitations for good and inclusive governance by various groups
including the Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro led movement of 1966, a militant
group named MEND alongside many other armed militias of the Niger Delta
region protested against the increasing environmental degradation and poverty
in the region in spite of the wealth generated from the region. The activities of
these groups also impacted significantly on the social, economic and political
growth of the country resulting in loss of lives and property. Prominent also in
the history of conflict in Nigeria is the ongoing terror campaign and
humanitarian crisis in the Northern part of Nigeria which has claimed the lives
of over 20,000 people and displaced more than 2.6 million persons (Peace
Direct, 2017). The current concern on the front burner of Nigeria’s security and
development today is the intensified violence between Cattle Herdsmen and
Rural Farmers in the country.
As noted by International Crisis Group (ICG) (2017) and Erondu &
Nwakanma (2018) the violent conflicts between nomadic cattle herders, who
are largely Fulani’s and sedentary agrarian communities in the central and
southern zones of Nigeria have escalated in recent years and have assumed
various dangerous dimensions threatening the country’s security and stability.
The ICG (2017) and Sahara Reporters (2018) opine that with an estimated
death toll of approximately 2,500 people in 2016 and over 300 in the first
quarter of 2018, these clashes are becoming as potentially dangerous as the
Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, Nigeria. While conflicts and violent
clashes between farmers and nomadic cattle herders have been a common
feature of economic livelihood in West Africa since time immemorial, the
recent increase in the violence and the application of dangerous weapons as
well as the systematization of the attacks have revealed a worrisome dimension
to this seemingly recalcitrant social problem in Nigeria. The concern now is the
immediate and impending implications of this feud, especially as it directly
impacts on peace, stability, human development, economic growth and
sustainable development (Erondu & Nwakanma, 2018). This paper concerns
itself with the various issues contributing to population overshoot in Nigeria
and the demographic dimensions of the Farmers–Herdsmen crisis in Nigeria.
Theoretical Framework
The perennial nature of the clashes between itinerant cattle Herders and
pastoralist Farmers in Nigeria informs the growing concern for viable and
lasting methods to improve on the relationship between these coexisting
livelihood groups. Conflict between these two groups over space and
ownership of natural resources has a long history throughout sub-Saharan
Africa. As noted by Moritz (2010) conflict between farmers and pastoralist
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have remained a constant occurrence in West Africa. While they have
coexisted in symbiotic relationships, there have been pockets of violence
between these two groups in many West African communities. Fights over
cattle have claimed thousands of lives in South Sudan and the Central African
Republic, worsening the humanitarian crises in two states devastated by civil
war. Militias raised by armed cattle herders have brought anarchy to parts of
northern Kenya, killing farmers white and black (The Telegraph, 2018). A
Nigerian Environmental Study Team (NEST) report of 1991 revealed that long
before these recent clashes in Nigeria, Fulani cattle herders and farmers have
always contended, at times violently, with each other for space and natural
resources in places Bornu, Benue, the then Gongola and Plateau States.
Davidheiser and Luna (2008) noted that the clashes between these two groups
are usually provoked conflict between these groups emerge as a result several
historical, social and environmental factors such as climate changes, drought,
famine, international development projects, demographic changes,
environmental degradation, ownership and utilization of available land, water
resources and vegetal resources. However, today, this perennial crisis has
assumed worrisome dimensions that pose serious threat to national cohesion
and growth. As noted by Nwosu (2017), while an accurate account of the death
toll resulting from herdsmen-farmer violence in Nigeria is difficult to come by
due to the lack of a dedicated database, newspaper reports of various incidents
involving the herdsmen and farmers in settled communities reveal that the
conflicts have resulted in the loss of over 60,000 lives since 2001, making it
deadlier than the notorious Boko Haram uprising. A BBC report also claims
that over 50,000 persons have been killed in the crisis between 2001 and 2004
and over 62, 000 person displaced in the Middle belt states of Benue, Kaduna,
Nassarawa and Plateau alone. Sadly, women and children accounted for almost
35,000 of these deaths (Nwosu, 2017; Kwaja & Ademola-Adelehin, 2018).
Another study provided an estimate of the economic cost of the Herdsmen-
Farmer conflicts in four states of Benue, Kaduna, Nassarawa and Plateau,
positing that about $14 billion is lost annually to destruction of property,
agricultural product, and the management of the Herdsmen-Farmers crisis
(Nwosu, 2017).
The frequency and intensity of these clashes has increased in recent times
spreading even to communities beyond the Middle Belt States. One of the most
prominent recent clashes allegedly perpetrated by cattle herders was the Agatu
Massacre in Benue State where about 300 Agatu indigenes in four
communities were massacred in cold blood, and more than 7,000 persons
displaced from their homes. As noted by Davidheiser & Luna (2008); Nwosu
(2017); Ajibefun (2018) these killings were accompanied by the destruction of
houses and other property, rape, as well as illegitimate occupation of victim
communities. Further South, on 25 April 2016, suspected armed herders
invaded Ukpabi Nimbo, an agrarian community in Enugu State, in a reprisal
attack, killing about 40 indigenes. Similar cases of herder-farmer conflicts have
been reported in Zamfara and Katsina States in the North, as well as Abia and
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Osun States in the South-East and South-West respectively (Channels, 2017;
Nwosu, 2017; Odunsi, 2017).
According to the ICG (2017) the spread of this conflict into Southern states
in Nigeria is aggravating already fragile relations among the country’s major
regional, ethnic and religious groups. Many have argued that the attacks largely
carried out by the Herders on perceived hostile communities is a systematic
ethnic cleansing; while the South’s majority Christian communities resent the
influx of predominantly Fulani–Muslim herders, portrayed in some narratives
as an “Islamization” programme of the North (Onwuka, 2017; Telegraph,
2018). The implications of these are enormous as they tend to provoke ethnic,
religious and political crisis in the country.
Trends and Drivers of Herders–Farmers conflict in Nigeria
Over the last decade violent clashes between Cattle Herders and Rural farmers
across communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria, have increased
exponentially with a lot of factors adduced as its causes. Kwaja & Ademola-
Adelehin (2018) noted that from Mali to South Sudan, Democratic Republic of
Congo to Nigeria, climate variability, environmental degradation, and socio-
political upheaval have shifted pastoralist migratory patterns and increased
tensions between farmers and herders. These changes have increased
confrontations between this two livelihood groups leading to violent conflict,
deaths, forced displacement and migration, erosion of inter-communal
relationships, as well as the destruction of agricultural and livestock outputs
(Mercy Corps, 2015).
Sinclair & Fryxell (1985) posit that the introduction of new irrigation
technology and modern farming techniques into Africa through development
projects allowed for the expansion of agriculture into relatively arid regions
which caused many farmers in the Sahel to expand into semi-arid regions
traditionally used by cattle Herders as grazing lands. For Van den Brink,
Bromley and Chavas (1995) cited in Davidheiser & Luna (2008), exclusive
property regimes’ in colonial and postcolonial Africa have also contributed to
the overuse of the resource base, amplification of negative effects of drought
periods, and increased conflicts between nomads and farmers. The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1996 explained how
poor pastures conditions in Niger and Mali have caused herders there to bring
their animals to Burkina Faso, straining Burkina's pasture resources. Areas
where water is available are particularly subject to overgrazing. The increasing
use of traditional pasturelands for crop production – particularly along the
border with Mali – has aggravated the situation and has led to increasing
conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists (USAID, 1996).
Within Nigeria, industrialization, urbanization, climate changes, expansion
of farms as well as the advancement of the Sahara Desert has blocked many
traditional grazing routes used by herders moving south as the Sahara Desert
advances in northern Nigeria. Environmental change in neighbouring countries,
such as the shrinkage of Lake Chad, have also caused a migration of foreign
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herders whose lack of familiarity with Nigerian populations often escalate
violent misunderstandings. ICG (2017) and Kwaja & Ademola-Adelehin (2018)
further noted that frequent droughts and desertification; loss of northern
grazing lands to the expansion of human settlements; new livestock and
farming practices; rural banditry and cattle rustling, etc, further exacerbate
everyday conflict between these two groups. As a matter of fact, much of the
clashes recorded between these groups are largely reprisals on perceived
hostility and unwarranted harassments by members of both livelihood groups.
As noted by Nwosu (2017) allegations of cattle rustling are at the heart of some
of the clashes as Herdsmen frequently justify their attacks on settled
communities with allegations that affected communities steal their cattle and
murder their colleagues and children. According to Mr. Mohammed Abdullahi,
the Chairman of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBA), in
Plateau State, this act has necessitated their bearing arms for defence since the
government has failed to protect them from rustlers and bandits (Nwosu, 2017).
Another worrisome issue in the Herders–Farmers crisis is the free flow of
criminals and bandits from neighbouring countries into Nigeria’s porous
borders. As noted by Nwosu (2017) most of the attacks allegedly perpetrated
by herdsmen can be traced to foreign transhumant Fulani’s and many other
armed groups especially from Libya, who move around unregulated offering
services as war mercenaries, bandits, and armed robbers. Though Nigeria has
no direct boundary with Libya, some quarters have linked escaping rebels
trained by Muammar Gaddafi to the spate of killings across Nigeria. These new
trends have further expanded the concern on how best to tackle this challenge
and create a safe environment for Nigerians in the face of the various factors
capable of escalating violence in Nigeria including the problem of population
overshoot.
Population growth, Resource Scarcity and Conflict
Since the end of the Second World War and an assessment of its impact on
human society, scholars have made various attempts to understand the
underlying causes of conflict and violence in the society; with the following
identified as prime causal factors: human innate aggressive nature, social
inequality, deprivation and poverty, issues of legitimacy, forced migration,
ethnicity, religious extremism, and resource scarcity. Prominent amongst these
perspectives is the resource scarcity model which argues that rapid population
growth is one of the major causes of scarcity of resources, which then triggers
armed conflict, predominantly in developing countries (Urdal, 2007; Dabelko,
2011). Resource scarcity here explains the lack of availability of supplies
required to maintain life, or a certain quality of life. Scarcity, as an economic
concept, assumes that humans have unlimited wants which must be fulfilled in
the face of finite available scarce resources, which tends to generate intra and
intergroup conflicts.
An analysis of the complex interactive effects of population growth on
society and of the broad system of factors driving conflict in developing
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countries by scholars such as Barbier (1999); Maxwell & Reuveny (2000);
Urdal (2007); Bretschger (2008) and Dabelko (2011), revealed that the
pressures of population growth, economic growth and climate change are
placing incredible stress on finite natural resources such as fossil fuels and
minerals, including land, potable water, etc. Demands for these resources
intensify as population increases and new actors join the competition for the
world’s remaining deposits of resources.
Although population statistics were before now imprecise, the world
population, according to Worldometers (2018), was estimated to be around 5
million at the dawn of agriculture in 8000 B.C. Over the 8,000-year period up
to 1 A.D, world population grew to about 300 million with a growth rate of
under 0.05% per year. A tremendous change occurred with the industrial
revolution resulting in a rapid increase in world population from around 300
million to over 5 billion 1987. Today the World population stands at
7,632,819,325 persons (Worldometers, 2018). Furthermore, a world population
review of 2018 revealed that human population across the globe grew from
6,789,771,253 in 2008 to 7,632,819,325 in 2018 at a yearly change of 1.24%.
The table 1 below shows world population growth per year, including the
percentage of yearly changes, net changes, density, urban population and urban
population percent per year; while table 2 shows the world population forecast
from year 2020 to year 2050, including the percentage of yearly changes and
the fertility rate per year. From the table 2 below, we can see that at a yearly
change rate of about 1% and a fertility rate of 2.47%, world population is
expected to increase from 7,795,482,309 in 2020 to 9,771,822,753 to 2050.
Table 1: World Population growth from 2008 to 2018
Year WorldPopulation
Yearly
Change Net Change
Density
(P/Km²) Urban Pop Urban Pop %
2018 7,632,819,325 1.09 % 82,557,224 51 4,186,975,665 55 %
2017 7,550,262,101 1.12 % 83,297,821 51 4,110,778,369 54 %
2016 7,466,964,280 1.14 % 83,955,460 50 4,034,193,153 54 %
2015 7,383,008,820 1.16 % 84,555,787 50 3,957,285,013 54 %
2014 7,298,453,033 1.18 % 85,026,581 49 3,880,128,255 53 %
2013 7,213,426,452 1.20 % 85,249,517 48 3,802,824,481 53 %
2012 7,128,176,935 1.21 % 85,168,349 48 3,725,502,442 52 %
2011 7,043,008,586 1.22 % 84,839,427 47 3,648,252,270 52 %
2010 6,958,169,159 1.23 % 84,428,105 47 3,571,272,167 51 %
2009 6,873,741,054 1.24 % 83,969,801 46 3,494,944,744 51 %
2008 6,789,771,253 1.24 % 83,352,660 46 3,419,420,251 50 %
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Table 2: World Population Forecast from year 2020 to year 2050
Year
(July 1) Population
Yearly %
Change
Yearly
Change
Median
Age
Fertility
Rate
Density
(P/Km²)
Urban
Pop % Urban Pop
2020 7,795,482,309 1.09 % 82,494,698 31 2.47 52 55.6 % 4,338,014,924
2025 8,185,613,757 0.98 % 78,026,290 32 2.43 55 57.5 % 4,705,773,576
2030 8,551,198,644 0.88 % 73,116,977 33 2.39 57 59.2 % 5,058,158,460
2035 8,892,701,940 0.79 % 68,300,659 34 2.35 60 60.7 % 5,394,234,712
2040 9,210,337,004 0.70 % 63,527,013 35 2.31 62 62.1 % 5,715,413,029
2045 9,504,209,572 0.63 % 58,774,514 35 2.27 64 63.5 % 6,030,924,065
2050 9,771,822,753 0.56 % 53,522,636 36 2.24 66 64.9 % 6,338,611,492
Source:Worldometers (2018, August 25)
It is important to note that these population forecasts posit that ten countries
will account for 64% of this projected world population increase. According to
United Nations world population prospects of 2017, countries like Egypt,
Pakistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bangladesh, Uganda, Ethiopia,
India, China, United States of America and Nigeria, owing to their population
tendencies, will contribute immensely to population overshoot by year 2050
(United Nations, 2017; Alexander, 2018). Nigeria in particular is currently
posting the fastest rate of population growth worldwide, and is expected to
contribute 19% to this population increase if current birthrate trends persist
(Jurczynska, 2013; McCarthy, 2017).
The United Nations population division projects that the overall population
of Nigeria, which is currently 195,875,237, will increase exponentially to about
410 million by the end of the year 2050, and to over 700 million by years 2100,
if the current figures continue. With these numbers, Nigeria will become the
third most populated country in the entire world, surpassing the United States
in the near future (UN, 2017; World Population Review, 2018). The following
infographic by Statista, a leading statistics research institution, shows the
world's most populous nations in 2050 created using the UN's population data.
Source: UN Population division (2017) and McCarthy (2017)
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From the figure above, the potential increase of Nigeria’s population from
190.89 million in 2017 to 410.64 million in 2050 can be seen. The explanations
for this rapid growth vary; some scholars such as Choucri (1983), Urdal (2007),
Bretschger (2008) posit that fertility rate, international as well as internal
migration from rural to urban centers, changes in the ethnic, religious and
racial composition of a population, amongst many other factors, account for
rapid population increase. The United Nations population division (2017) cited
high fertility rates, high infant mortality rates and the cultural value of large
families as factors driving Nigeria's population boom. For Theodore (2006)
Religious doctrines, poor education on implications of unplanned families,
male-child preference, old age social (in)security and poor health care systems
account for the uncontrolled population growth in Nigeria. While all these
arguments are tenable, the concern however is what this statistics on ground
mean for peace and stability in Nigeria particularly in the face of poor
economic policies, high unemployment rate, housing deficits, dearth of
infrastructure, etc, coupled with the present inability of the Nigerian state to
make sustainable population management policies.
Theoretical Framework
The thesis of this paper is hinged on the demographic theory of conflict which
postulates that rapidly expanding population and scarcity of resources are
sources of violent conflict. Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), a foremost scholar
of the demographic theory, argued in his work “An Essay on the Principle of
Population”, that population growth eventually will place catastrophic pressure
on resource use leading to famines, conflict, and other stress. Green (2005)
noted that the Malthusian theory of conflict connects the contradictions
between population growth and the society’s ability to ensure adequate
minimum means of subsistence for the rapidly growing population to the
prevalence of conflict in the society. A variant of this theory, the youth bulge
perspective, proposed by the German Social scientist, Gunnar Heinsohn in the
mid-1990s, and refined by Gary Fuller and Jack Goldstone have also argued
that the disproportion between the rapidly growing youth population and the
number of positions and opportunities for sustainable livelihood available to
them in society is a major catalyst of the different forms of social unrest in
human societies. Neo-Malthusian scholars, such as Robert Kaplan and Thomas
Fraser have expanded Malthus’ ideas to more than just food, but to also
competition for energy resources, arable land, political control, etc. They argue
that wars and civil violence will increase as food, clean air, fuel, and suitable
farmland become scarcer.
This theory explains the Herdsmen–Farmers conflict situation in Nigeria,
especially as competition for resources and space highlights the Herdsmen–
Farmers crisis. While various structural factors explain the Herders–Farmers
crisis, rapid population growth and the attendant resource scarcity, including
environmental degradation, industrialization, etc, have fostered conditions
conducive to conflict generation and intensification. Blench (2010) have
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posited that the rise in natural resource conflicts is as a result of human
population increase and the globalization of the economy and this demographic
change remains the most preponderant source of the Herdsmen–Farmers
conflict in Nigeria.
Population dimensions of conflict and Nigeria’s Herders–Farmers crisis
While a number of factors have been identified as sources of conflict, the
rapidity of population growth in the developing countries has been identified to
present its own set of challenges. Population increases have been suspected to
have an impact on virtually every environmental, health, education, economic
and gender equity concern in the world, especially in countries with stressed
resources (Population Institute, 2007). John Wilmoth, the director of the
population division in the UN’s department of economic and social affairs,
noted that this situation makes it more difficult to eradicate poverty and
inequality, to combat hunger and malnutrition, and to expand educational
enrolment and health systems, all of which are crucial to the success of the new
sustainable development agenda (Jones & Anderson, 2015). Bretschger (2008)
and Dimick (2014) posit that the phenomenon of rapid increase in human
population over the past three centuries raises concerns that the world may not
be able to sustain present or future numbers of inhabitants. Arguments have
been put forward that many environmental problems, such as rising levels of
atmospheric carbon dioxide, global warming, and pollution, are aggravated by
the population expansion (Bretschger, 2008; Dimick, 2014). Other problems
associated with overpopulation include the increased demand for resources
such as fresh water and food, starvation and malnutrition, consumption of
natural resources (such as fossil fuels) faster than the rate of regeneration as
well as rapid deterioration in living conditions.
There is also a strong correlation between overpopulation and conflict
(Urdal, 2007; Bretschger, 2008; Dimick, 2014). Choucri (1983) noted that
while the absence of population related pressures does not guarantee peace,
pressures from overwhelming population could increase the probability of
conflict. This is particularly true when additional aggravating factors such as
widening economic disparities, weak infrastructure, worsening environmental
conditions and dwindling natural resources are also present. Angola and Sudan,
for example, are commonly cited extreme examples of low-income countries
under population and resource scarcity stress. The list also includes Haiti, the
Central African Republic, Somalia, the Solomon Islands and Myanmar. In all
of these cases, empirical evidences reveal that population density taxes
available space and resources, thereby undermining stability (Population
Institute, 2007). Urdal (2007) in a time-series study of 27 Indian states for the
period of 1956–2002 on sub-national effects of population pressure on violent
political conflict, argued that violent conflict is associated with high population
pressure on renewable natural resources, with youth bulges and with
differential growth rates between ethnic and religious groups.
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This paper sees population increase and resource scarcity as risks of violent
conflict in Nigeria, particularly when interacting with high rural population
growth, youth bulge and low agricultural yield. The Nigerian Working Group
on Peace Building and Governance in a paper released on January 7, 2018,
argued that the phenomenal increase of Nigeria’s population has put enormous
stress on resources used by farmers and pastoralists (Premium Times, 2018).
Population increase has evidently led to an expansion in cultivated farmland, a
reduction in available grazing land for pastoralists; while the impact of
desertification as well as the crisis of energy, which has resulted in
deforestation, coupled with climatic uncertainty and lower rainfall have made it
more difficult to sustain increasing populations, pushing many farmers and
pastoralists with livestock southwards (Nyong & Fiki, 2005; Premium Times,
2018). One of the many outcomes of this development, according to the
Nigerian Working Group on Peace Building and Governance, has been the
blockage of transhumance routes, loss of grazing land to agricultural expansion
and the increased southward movement of pastoralists which has resulted in
severe conflict with local communities. This is particularly the case in
communities in Plateau, Kaduna, Niger, Nasarawa, Benue, Taraba and
Adamawa States.
Conclusion
This paper has identified the Herdsmen-Farmers crisis in Nigeria as a resource-
use crisis propelled by the uncontrolled population growth phenomenon in the
country. As posited by Green (2005), Urdal (2007), Blench (2010) and Dimick
(2014), human population increase, especially of the youth population and the
economic crisis are the key catalysts of conflict in the society. Relying on the
Demographic theory of conflict, this paper explains how the phenomenal
increase of Nigeria’s population has put enormous stress on resources used by
farmers and pastoralists. As noted earlier the population increase in Nigeria has
evidently led to an expansion in cultivated farmland to meet the food needs of
the society, reduction in available grazing land for pastoralists; while the
impact of desertification, deforestation, coupled with climatic uncertainty and
lower rainfall have made it more difficult to sustain increasing populations,
pushing many farmers and pastoralists with livestock southwards. In line with
these issues and the multiplying effect of rapidly growing population and
prevalence of conflict in Nigeria, this paper recommends that Nigeria as a
country should begin to pay serious attention to the costs and impacts of
population growth and create accordingly rights-based population policies that
adapts Nigeria’s population strength to a positive force for sustainable
development. These population policies must include: the establishment of
quality and accessible medical facilities that guarantee maternal and child
health care and care for the aged; the eradication of gender bias from law,
economic opportunity, health, and culture; and most importantly, the
integration of education on population, environment, and resource scarcity into
school curricula at various levels.
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